**POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS**

WESTERN COUNTRIES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

**COMPENDIUM**

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# 1. Introduction – the goals and aims of the course

This compendium is developed for the BA-course *Political Institutions: Western countries, The European Union and International Institutions* (PI). The course deals with political systems and their interactions. Its focus is on providing students with an understanding of how political systems work, as well as the causes and consequences of institutional differences for the representativeness and efficiency of political decision-making processes.

The course contains three core elements: 1) national political systems and institutional differences between these systems; 2) international cooperation and the interaction between political systems; and 3) the political system of the EU.

The first bloc of the course provides insights into the political systems of selected countries and the significance of key institutional differences across political systems. This includes differences between presidential and parliamentary systems, federal states and unitary states, and the modes of operation in parliaments and governments.

The second bloc of the course concentrates on the interaction between political systems, transnational politics and related theories. In particular, we focus on theories aimed at explaining the formation and operation of international organisations, as well as different types of transnational governance.

The third bloc of the course focuses on the EU’s political system and the various theories that have been developed in relation to it. This includes theories about European integration, representation and elections in the EU, and the EU’s institutional structure, mode of operation and foreign policy.

The goal of the course is to give students a general knowledge of how political institutions at various levels of governance function, develop, and impact democratic representation and decision-making. Specifically, the course aims to give students the following competences:

* The student must be able to describe the political system of selected western countries, the EU, and international organizations.
* The student must be able to describe selected theories of how political actors interact in and through political institutions.
* The student must be able to compare key empirical differences between political systems and identify the differences and similarities.
* The student must be able to compare selected theories about the relationship between political actors and institutions and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these theories
* The student must be able to apply the general methods of political science to independently and systematically analyze issues regarding institutions, political systems and their interaction.
* The student must be able to apply the theories of the course to analyse empirical material and issues regarding institutions and their interaction to independently and systematically discuss and assess the relevance and scope of application of these theories.

These overall learning objectives can be divided into three major headings (as illustrated in Table 1): theoretical knowledge, empirical knowledge, and an ability to apply theories to empirical material.

In order to achieve these goals, the course has been organized as described in Sections 3 and 4.

**Table 1. Overall learning objectives for the course**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Theory** | **Empirical knowledge** | **Application** |
| The student must be able to describe selected theories of how political actors interact in and through political institutions.  They must be able to compare selected theories about the relationship between political actors and institutions and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these theories | The student must be able to describe the political system of selected western countries, the EU, and selected international organizations. | The student must be able to apply the general methods of political science to independently and systematically analyze issues regarding institutions, political systems and their interaction.  The student must be able to apply the theories of the course to analyze empirical material and issues regarding institutions and their interaction. The goal here is to independently and systematically discuss and assess the relevance and scope of application of these theories. |

# 2. The course’s relation to other courses on the BA in Political Science

The course is closely connected to other BA-courses in political science at Aarhus University. Figure 1 places PI in relation to other courses taught in the BA-education through a simplified version of an input-output-model. It should be noted that the model is a simplified presentation and certain overlaps will occur between the different courses. On overall level General Political Science (Almen Statskundskab) deals with the input side of the political system. It presents knowledge of and theories about social cleavages, opinion formation, the role of public opinion and on political participation. The course on Public Policy (Offentlig Politik) overall focuses on the outcome side – political decisions, policies, regimes and reforms that are treated as the dependent variable. International Relations (International Politik) deals in a broad sense with the international systems, and how states interacts and conduct their foreign policies where the focus is on the structure of the international system and the role of conflicts and cooperation between states.

# 3. The organization of the course

PI focuses on what happens in the so-called “black box” between demands expressed in civil society to policies influencing the living conditions in a society. It is per definition difficult to study what happens in a black box. In PI we open the black box by studying the way power is organized in central political institutions and how they operate in order to reach political decisions. We thus study the role of the structures as well as the modus operandi of selected political institutions. The classic input-output-models were traditional primary limited to and aimed at understanding domestic politics and distributive processes on this level.

However, to give a comprehensive understanding of how the most important political institutions are structured and function we need to acknowledge that modern governance is multilayered. There are multiple

**Figure 1: The PI course role in the BA-program**

**International relations**

Structure, conflict and cooperation between states

(International Relations (IP))

**Output/outcome:**

Policies, policy reforms, policy regimes

(Public Policy (OP))

**Input:**

Social cleaveges, public opinion, participation

(General Political Science (Almen))

**Political institutions:**

Legislatures, executives and decision-making procedures in domestic and international organizations in Western Europe

(Political institutions (PI))

layers of authority from municipalities over nation states to supranational organizations. Therefore, in order to grasp these different layers of authority, PI needs to draw on insight from Comparative Politics as well as International Relations to understand the way power is structured within as well as between states. The overall theoretical framework used to bridge Comparative Politics and IR is theories of institutionalism. Institutionalism has been a central theoretical tendency that have drawn focus on how institutions are created and their effects on behavior and policies, which has been themes in studies of international relations and in comparative politics

The course PI is organized according to the different layers of governance in modern developed democracies and makes a distinction between 2 layers: the national level and the regional level (EU) and focus on how and why states creates international institutions and how they impact upon states behavior by giving examples from NATO and UN. Figure 2 illustrates the organization of the course.

**Figure 2: Illustration of the structure of PI**



This means that the overall organization of the course will consist off three overall blocks:

We start the course with a general introduction to the concept of institutions and theories about the relationship between actors and institutions (L1). This general framework is relevant for all aspects of the course even though a somewhat different terminology is used in the different research traditions.

* In the first bloc (weeks 2-5), we focus on the national level of governance (we do not move below the national level so we will not discuss municipalities or states in much detail). Empirically we focus on Western democracies when applying typologies to describe national political institutions such as electoral systems, legislatures and executives.
* The second bloc (weeks 6-8) takes one further step towards studying political institutions beyond the nation state. Based on theories from Institutional theories we discuss why states choose to create international organizations and whether and how states can control international organizations when they are first are created. Empirical we will draw on examples from the UN, NATO and the EU.
* The third bloc (weeks 9-14) deals with the European Union as an example of regional level governance. The political system of EU will be explained in detail but EU will also be analysed from an IR-perspective as an example of cooperation between sovereign nation states and as an actor in international politics. This EU-bloc is the largest bloc in the course since it is a goal of PI in itself that students are familiar with the EU political system and because EU as an empirical case bridges the research traditions of comparative politics and international relations.

Finally, in the last week of teaching we discuss how the study of institutions draw on different traditions in comparative politics and international relations and make a critical reflection on the contribution of institutional theories. The course can be described on more details in table 2.

**Table 2. Organization of the course: Lectures and classes**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Week** | **Lecturer** | **Theme** |
| L1 Jan. 31 | HHP | Introduction: Institutionalism   * Hall & Taylor (1996) New institutionalism * Compendium comments (supplementary reading) |
| C1 |  | Institutionalism beyond Comparative Politics and International Relations   * Jupille & Caporaso (1999) Institutionalism and the European Union |
| **Block 1: Political institutions in Western countries** | | |
| L2: Feb. 7 | AK | Electoral systems and party systems   * Repetition: Gallager (2013) Electoral systems * Caramani (2013) Party systems * Benoit (2007) Electoral laws as political consequences |
| C2 |  | Electoral systems and womens representation   * McAlister & Studlar (2002) Electoral systems and women’s representation: a long-term perspective |
| L3: Feb. 14 | HHP | Legislatures   * Kreppel (2014) Typologies and Classifications * Sieberer (2011) The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments |
| C3 |  | Classifying legislatures   * Dalton (2012) Politics in Germany * Schain (2012) Politics in France |
| L4: Feb. 21 | HHP | Governments   * Cheibub et al. (2004) Government Coalition and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism |
| C4 |  | Government efficiency and responsiveness   * Coleman (1999) Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness |
| L5: Feb. 28 | AK | Federalism   * Loughlin (2011) Federal and local government institutions * Beramendi (2007) Federalism |
| C5 |  | Representation in federal systems   * Wlezien & Soroka (2011) Federalism and Public Responsiveness to Policy |
| **Block 2: International cooperation** | | |
| L6: March 7 | RBP | Why states create international organisations   * Keohane (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy * Stein (1982) Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World   *Supplementary readings: Jackson & Sørensen pp. 107-110* |
| C6 |  | Establishing international security cooperation   * Schimmelfennig (2016) NATO and institutional theories of international relations |
| L7: March 14 | RBP | What do international institutions do?   * Buzan (2004) From International to World Society? * Barnett & Finnemore (2007) Practical approach * Knudsen (2015) Primary institutions and international organizations: Theorizing continuity and change |
| C7 |  | * Same as lecture |
| L8: March 21 | RBP | Economic and political cooperation: EU integration process   * Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig (2009). Liberal Intergovernmentalism * Niemann & Schmitter (2009). Neo-functionalism |
| C8 | RBP | * Schimmelfennig (2015) Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis * Niemann & Ioannou (2015) European economic integration in times of crisis: a case of neofunctionalism? |
| **Block 3: The EU** | | |
| L9: March 28 | AK | The political system of the EU   * Hix & Høyland (2011) pp. 1-18 * Hargreaves & Homewood (2013) EU Law Concentrate: Law Revision and Study Guide |
| C9 |  | No readings – trial exam |
| L10: April 4 | AK | Executive politics in the EU   * Hix & Høyland (2011) pp. 23-48 |
| C10 |  | A new type of Commission?   * Peterson (2016) Juncker's Political European Commission and an EU in Crisis. |
| L11: April 18 | DF | Legislative politics in the EU   * Hix & Høyland (2011) pp. 49-75 |
| C11 |  | * Rasmussen & Reh (2013) The consequences of concluding codecision early * Häge & Kaeding (2007) Reconsidering the European Parliament’s legislative influence |
| L12: April 25 | DF | Elections and democracy in the EU   * Hix & Høyland (2011) pp. 105-157 |
| C12 |  | * Follesdal & Hix (2006) Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU |
| L13: May 2 | DF | Judicial politics in the EU   * Hix & Høyland (2011) pp. 75-105 |
| C13 |  | * Carrubba, Gabel & Hankla (2008) Judicial behavior under political constraints * Dyevre (2010). Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics |
| L14: May 9 | DF | The EU as a global actor   * Hix & Høyland (2011) pp. 302-331 |
| C14 |  | * Dür & Zimmermann (2007) Introduction: The EU in international trade negotiations * Da Conceicao (2010) Who controls whom? Dynamics of power delegation and agency losses in EU trade politics |
| **Outro** | | |
| L15: May 16 | RBP, DF, HHP, AK | Wrap up and critical reflections and exam |
|  |  | Exam preparations |

PI is organized as most other BA-courses with four hours teaching per week. Two hours of lectures and two hours of class discussions. The exam is a six-hour written exam and after the course students are expected to be able to describe political institutions and theories about them and to be able to compare these institutions and theories in a theoretically informed empirical analysis. The descriptive element of the course is thus strong giving students an opportunity to gather knowledge of various political institutions on the national as well as international level of governance.

To make the teaching activities support the achievement of the learning objectives lectures will focus on providing knowledge of concepts, typologies and theories for defining, classifying and understanding the function and structure of political institutions, while classes will focus on applying these concepts, typologies and theories on empirical material. Exercises for the classes will focus on 1) supporting the gathering of empirical knowledge of selected political institutions for instance through class presentations and 2) training writing skills through smaller weekly written assignments.

Lectures as well as classes will be taught in English just as all written assignments must be in English.

The final exam can be written in Danish or English.

## Lectures

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If you have any practical questions you are welcome to contact one or both of the coordinators.

# 4. Comments for the reading material

**Week 1: Introduction to Institutionalism**

*Lecture*

PI starts out with an introduction to the role of institutionalism in political science and how it has developed. Here the definition of institutions as well as the different positions on how institutions and actors stand in relation to each other is discussed. We also use this first week to discuss why studies of political institutions in systems of multilevel governance need to draw on ideas from comparative politics as well as international relations.

Political institutions have always played a prominent role in political science. In the late nineteenth and early twenties century scholars were concerned with describing formal political institutions such as constitutions, legislatures and administrative apparatuses. This tradition has been labelled ‘old institutionalism’ and was critiqued of being too descriptive not leading to cumulative knowledge and theory development. Political scientists, especially in US, reacted by initiating the behavioral approach (behaviouralism) in the years after World War II. Here the importance of political institutions was either rejected or reduced and it was argued that political behavior could not be explained or studied by reading formal rules but only by observing actual behavior. Political phenomena were explained by the aggregate behavior of individual (rational and strategic) actors. However, ‘new institutionalism’ evolved as a reaction to behaviouralism around the 1980s. One of the reasons was that scholars found themselves unable to explain important political outcomes by only taking the individual interests of the actors into account. For instance, rational choice scholars of the US Congress found it difficult to explain coordination and cooperation among Members of Congress. ‘New institutionalism’ in general has a broader understanding of institutions including informal institutions such as procedures and norm and they also theorize more explicitly about the relationship between actors and institutions.

In the text for the lecture Hall & Taylor (1996) argues that the approach of ‘new institutionalism’ can be divided into three schools of institutionalism: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. They describe and compare the different schools highlighting the most important differences and similarities. They also discuss the potential these schools hold for explaining the creation and change of political institutions.

The new institutionalism has had a tremendous impact on political science. So much, that Pierson and Skocpol claim that *“we are all institutionalists now”*. The relevance and use of institutional approaches have perhaps been nowhere more profound than in the study of the European Union.

*Classes*

In the text for the first class Jupille and Caporaso build on the new institutionalist approach and argue that the institutional approach has made it possible to formulate a more coherent study of the European Union which as a political phenomenon stands ambiguously between the fields of international relations and comparative politics. By reviewing studies of EU they classify the institutionalist approaches according to their assumptions regarding institutions and preferences and discuss how an institutional approach offers analytical tools for analyzing the most recent questions in the study of EU. Their main argument is that a generic form of institutionalism is more promising for the study of EU than sticking in the camps of comparative politics or international relations.

*Learning objectives for week 1*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Theory** | **Empirical knowledge** | **Application** |
| * Describe the three new institutional approaches * Discuss their differences and similarities * Discuss their strengths and weaknesses | - | * Use institutionalisms to discuss how EU as a political phenomenon can be understood in different ways |

**Bloc 1: Political institutions in Western countries**

In the first bloc we introduce essential political institutions in Western countries. Specifically we discuss four political institutions, which are central for the way power is distributed and operates in political systems. These institutions are the electoral system, legislatures, executives and federalism. For each of these institutions we discuss 1) how to classify them, 2) potential causes of variations and 3) potential consequences for representation and efficiency.

Week 2: Electoral systems

While parliaments and governments are in many ways the core institutions that make democracies function on an everyday basis,which parties enter parliament and, subsequently, form the government is not a given. This is not least because the electoral rules governing how people vote and how these votes are translated into parliamentary seats vary greatly between countries. We will study what consequences the organization of electoral systems have on social outcomes like turnout and the representation of minority interests. In reality, the electoral system of a country is never neutral: it always benefits some groups in society over others. Given this inherent issue, it is vital to understand why some countries adopt one electoral system over another.

*Lecture*

This lecture addresses three primary questions: what is an electoral system?; how do electoral systems matter?; and why do electoral systems differ across countries? It begins with a brief overview of the key distinctions among electoral systems. Although you were already introduced to the topic in Pol.Intro, we start with a refresher given the wide variety of electoral systems out there (hence the repetition from Caramani). Crucially, this overview will also allow us to home in on some the electoral system characteristics that are especially important to outcomes we may care about (such as inequality and minority representation). We then turn to a discussion of why different countries have ended up with different electoral systems, using the Benoit article as our starting point. This view of electoral laws as political consequences will then be illustrated using a recent example from the UK.

*Classes*

In lecture we discussed some of the consequences of electoral systems, and we use the tutorial this week to focus in on one of these effects: how does a country’s electoral system affect women’s representation in parliament? We will use the article by McAlister and Studlar (2002) to kick off a discussion about what factors seem to matter for the number of women elected to parliament. Yet your own research will be essential to this discussion, as the exercise this week will have you updating the data in the article and conducting research on a country of your choice.

*Learning objectives of week 2*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Theory** | **Empirical knowledge** | **Application** |
| * Describe different types of electoral systems * Describe causes of variation in electoral system types * Describe some of the consequences of different electoral system types | * Describe factors that might shape women’s legislative representation in developed countries * Be familiar with general patterns in women’s legislative representation as they relate to electoral systems | * Discuss in what ways electoral systems might increase or decrease women’s legislative representation |

Week 3: Legislatures

Almost all countries have some kind of legislature. Legislatures in Western countries are comparative old and have served as inspiration for many younger legislatures around the world. Legislatures have been research objects in political science for centuries as scholars have asked how legislatures are organized, what they do, and not least how powerful they are. During the era of old institutionalism especially descriptive typologies and detailed single case descriptions of the formal organization and procedures of legislatures were prominent. We now build on this research as studies of legislature moves towards a more new institutionalist approach where informal as well as formal characteristics are taken into account and the search for explanations to the variation across legislatures has set in.

*Lecture*

In the lecture, you are provided with an overview of the relevant dimensions for describing legislatures such as the relationship between the legislature and the executive, the tasks of a legislature and the organizational differences in terms of chambers and committees. Furthermore, more recent attempts of classifying legislatures proposed by Kreppel and Sieberer are presented showing how legislatures may not only be classified into boxes of weak and strong legislatures but can be measured on more dimensions regarding their institutional independence and power resources to give a more accurate and dynamic description of modern legislatures. Hereby, it also becomes evident how legislatures not only circumscribe the behavior of legislative actors but also are products of powerful actors’ interaction.

*Classes*

In the class for this week, you will read about the French and German legislatures to get a detailed knowledge of these systems. In the exercise, you are asked to apply the theoretical knowledge from the lecture to describe and compare the French and German legislatures according to the dimensions presented in the lecture.

*Learning objectives for week 3*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Theory** | **Empirical knowledge** | **Application** |
| * Identify dimensions for classifying legislatures * Discuss strengths and weaknesses of different typologies | * Detailed knowledge of the French and German legislatures | * Use typologies to describe and classify legislatures * Discuss potential cause and consequences of the institutional design of legislatures. |

Week 4: Executives

A major theme for old institutionalist studies is the constitutional division of power between the executive and legislative powers. The most prominent dichotomy for describing these relations are presidential versus parliamentary regimes. Whereas many institutionalist studies have been occupied with how to classify regimes within these two broad categories and their subcategories, new institutionalism has drawn increased attention toward the consequences of different regime types for representation and efficiency. In this week, we build a causal chain where we first ask how parliamentary/presidential regimes influence government formation and second how different types of governments within these two regime types influence legislative efficiency (lecture) and responsiveness (class).

*Lecture*

In the lecture, you are introduced to the major differences between presidential and parliamentary regimes and the traditional critique of the representativeness and efficiency of these systems. The lecture presents a definition of a government and different types of governments such as majority and minority, coalition and single-party governments. Based on this common framework the lecture use the article by Cheibub et al. (2004) to discuss first if coalition governments are more likely in parliamentary regimes and second if minority governments are less legislative efficient in presidential regimes. The main theoretical argument is that government formation and legislative efficiency is a product of the interaction between incentives regulated by political institutions and the preferences of political actors – in this case political parties.

*Classes*

In the classes for this week, we continue the discussion on the potential consequences of different types of government. Specifically we consider the case of divided government in US. Coleman (1999) revisits the claim that divided governments are just as efficient as unified governments and argues that scholars have 1) neglected important moderating institutional factor and 2) misinterpreted the party government model and thus neglected the importance of responsiveness rather than efficiency in the production of bills. In the exercise, you are asked to apply your theoretical knowledge from the lecture to define and explain divided government and to discuss the consequences of different forms of government in the case of US.

*Learning objectives of week 4*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Theory** | **Empirical knowledge** | **Application** |
| * Define different types of government and executive-legislative relations * Discuss potential strength and weaknesses of parliamentary and presidential systems * Explain the potential impact of regime types on coalition formation * Explain the potential impact of government type on legislative efficiency | * Explain the decision-making procedure in US * Explain what is meant by divided government in US | * Use definitions of different governments to describe and classify governments in Western countries * Make theoretically informed analyses of possible consequences of different types of government |

Week 5: Federalism

So far the course has concentrated on national level political institutions like legislatures and executives. These are clearly very important, yet in many countries power is not concentrated at the national level, but is rather spread out across federal sub-units (e.g. states, provinces, cantons). This week’s focus on federalism will serve as an essential part of the national bloc – allowing us to grasp just how much of an impact federal structures have on the way other political institutions function in a country. What is more, it will also provide a helpful bridge to the EU bloc, since it serves as an introduction to multi-level governance.

*Lecture*

The lecture explores the role of federalism in modern-day democracies, using the texts by Loughlin and Beramendi as an introduction to federalism and the major debates surrounding it in the literature. We start by providing an overview of the main characteristics of federal as opposed to unitary states, while at the same time distinguishing federalism from decentralisation. We will then turn to outline the historical origins of federalist institutions: why have some countries chosen this particular mode of government, while others haven’t? Next, we will proceed to examine how federalist institutions affect the operation of democracy, in the process touching on some of the other discussions we have engaged in during the national bloc. Given the nature of federalism, we will also discuss how it has a profound effect on the distribution of resources across a federation. Finally, we end the lecture by briefly discussing how traditional federalism (the topic of this lecture) might relate to the European Union (as the subject of the next lecture bloc).

*Classes*

As we discussed in lecture, federalism has important implications for the way democracies work. One crucial implication relates to the extent of democratic accountability, since it can be difficult in a federation to disentangle the issues that matter for elections at the federal versus subnational levels. The tutorial this week therefore focuses on the extent to which voters are able to sort out which policy actions and responsibilities belong to which levels of government. The discussion will start from Wlezien and Soroka’s investigation of public responsiveness in Canada. In your groups, you will then conduct your own research on the Canadian federation to better understand not only how federalism works in practice, but also the difficulties in assigning responsibility for policy outcomes.

*Learning objectives of week 5*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Theory** | **Empirical knowledge** | **Application** |
| * Describe federalism and distinguish it from alternative forms of governance * Discuss the relationship between federalism and decentralisation * Describe some potential causes and consequences of federalism | * Describe the concept of accountability and its relationship to federalism * Describe some of the complexities inherit in federalism using the Canadian example | * Discuss the connection between public opinion and government responsibilities in a federation |

**Bloc 2: International institutions**

In the second bloc we move beyond the nation state and introduce various approaches to study the question of why states choose to cooperate internationally, why they choose to institutionalize their cooperation by creating international institutions. We further investigate the question of what these types of institutions can do, and once created whether they can develop a life of their own, independent from the states that created them in the first place. The bloc introduces you to International Relations theories treatment of institutionalism and tries to bridge comparative politics and IR with the common institutionalist focus.

Week 6: RC and Security cooperation

The first week in this block addresses some of the fundamental questions of the creation and maintenance of international cooperation. The main focus is to give a deeper understanding of the Rational choice institutionalism and how insights have been utilized and translated in the IR literature to explain why states chooses to cooperate. The particular focus is on Liberal Institutionalism and how and why states create international organizations and regimes. It is important to have an understanding of the role of preferences, level of information, trust in order to understand the strength and durability of the international organizations that states create in order to regulate their interactions.

*Lecture*

This lecture addresses three primary questions: Why do states choose to cooperate; what can explain the decisions to create international institutions; and what design do they choose for the organization. The theoretical backbone in this lecture is Rational Choice institutionalism. Based on rational choice and game theoretical insights the lecture presents a framework that can be utilized to answer the three above mentioned questions. We focus in particular on the relevance of preferences, information and expected utility. In addition we draws on the insights from SI and HI.

*Classes*

In the lecture we introduced a theoretical rational choice framework to explain why states cooperate and why they form institutions. In the classes we want you to utilize this framework to analyze the cooperation in the NATO alliance and discuss how this organization works and how it can be changed in the future

*Learning objectives of week 6*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Theory | Empirical knowledge | Application |
| * Describe RC intuitionalism * Understand the logics in the theory and its approach to the formation and the design of international organizations * Describe some of the consequences institutional designs have on states behavior | * Knowledge of the organization of NATO as an example of an international organization * Describe factors that might shape international organizations | * Apply institutionalist explanations to explain why NATO was created and how it can be changed in the future to meet new security threats. |

Week 7: What do institutions do?

The second week of this block deals with the question of what happens when international institutions are created and ask whether the states that have created the institutions can control them and whether there are unintended consequences of the establishment of international institutions.

*Lecture*

The lecture takes it point of departure in sociological institutionalism and insights from the IR literature the lecture asks the question about what happens when states have established international institutions. Can states control the institutions and what impact do these institutions have on the behavior of the founding states? The lectures treats institutions based on the insights from the English school, and its focus on primary and secondary institutions and how they develop and evolve.

Taken its empirical point of departure in examples from the UN cooperation it focus on the impact of the creation of international norms and procedures for conflict resolutions and whether the evolution of international norms can be said to be in the control of the member states or whether institutions tends to live a life on their own. The lecture also introduces historical institutionalism to answer these questions, especially the role of path dependency, and whether these institutional paths can be said to follow the initial ideas behind the creation of the international institutions.

*Classes*

The classes will draw on the literature from the lecture and focus on whether institutions are in the control of member states or whether institutions can have a life of their own. The aim is to utilize the theoretical approaches on a concrete case about the UN’s Right to protect framework that have evolved over the last decades.

*Learning objectives of week 7*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Theory | Empirical knowledge | Application |
| * Describe Sociological and Historical institutionalism * Understand the logics in the theory and its approach to the formation and the design of international organizations and whether states can continue to control institutions * Describe some of the consequences institutional designs have on states behavior | * Knowledge of the organization of UN as an example of an international organization where states have difficulties in controlling * Describe factors that might shape international organizations impact upon states behavior | * Apply institutionalism to explain why UN system can evolve beyond the control of the member states preferences |

Week 8: Political and economic cooperation: EU integration process

The final week in this block synthesizes elements in the three institutionalisms in the study of the European integration process. The goal is to illustrate how the institutional logics have been in cooperated in theories like Neo-functionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism and their explanation of the European integration process. Another goal is to prepare the students for the following block on EUs institutions. Here a solid knowledge of the process that shaped these institutions is a precondition for the understanding of the debates and conflicts lines within and across the EU institutions.

*Lecture*

This lecture addresses three questions: What is the European Integration process? How can it be studied? And how can we understand the institutional design of the cooperation? The lecture presents the students with an oversight of the integration process and its dynamics. Two central integration theories, Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism is then introduces and used to explain the main developments in the cooperation. Since both theories draws on institutional theories they will be used to give us an understanding of the overall institutional and balance between the institutions and its member states.

*Classes*

In the class the students will be trained to apply the NF and the LI theories to explain the politics of the “euro crisis”. The students will be asked to compare the two perspectives and reflect on the usefulness of the theories and reflect on whether we should expect “institutional change” in response to the “euro crisis”?

*Learning objectives of week 8*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Theory | Empirical knowledge | Application |
| * Understand neofunctionalism, especially the role of spill over logics * Understand Liberal Intergovernmentalism * Understand the logics in the two theories, their relation to institutional theory | * Knowledge of the European integration process | * Apply NF and LI theories to explain the integration processes and its dynamics with a focus on the Euro crisis |

**Bloc 3: The European Union**

Our third and final bloc turns to introduce and examine the European Union, which serves as an example of regional level governance. There are two major objectives in this section. First, we set out to provide a detailed introduction to the EU and its institutional and policy architecture. Second, we analyze the EU from an IR-perspective, treating it both as an example of cooperation among sovereign nation states and as an actor in international politics. The bloc will ensure that students are familiar with the EU as a political system (a major goal of the course in its own right) while at the same time bridging the research traditions of Comparative Politics and International Relations.

Week 9: The Political System of the EU

In this week we introduce the EU as a political system. This involves both a brief overview of its historical development and an introduction to its institutional and policy architecture. It will therefore set the stage for the rest of the bloc, over the course of which we will go into detail on the various topics introduced this week.

*Lecture*

We begin by building from last week’s discussion of the EU integration process, briefly recapping a few key moments and treaties in the development of the EU. In doing so, we aim to broadly sketch out how the EU came about and how it has changed over time. Next, we proceed to discuss the EU’s policy architecture: what policy areas are under the control of the EU? Which are shared by the EU and member states, or coordinated between them? And which policy areas are outside of EU competencies? We then introduce the institutional architecture of the EU, providing an overview of the EU’s key institutions (which will be fleshed out in the coming weeks). Finally, we end with the question: how can we best understand the European Union? Is it similar to an international organization (like the UN) or a federal state (like the US)? This lecture thus sets the stage for the rest of the bloc.

*No Classes – Trial Exam*

*Learning objectives of week 19*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Theory | Empirical knowledge | Application |
| * Understand theories on how the EU came about * Describe the broad theoretical frameworks on how politics in the EU works | * Key moments in the development of the EU * The broad division of control over policy between the EU and member states * The EU’s institutional architecture | - |

Week 10: Executive politics in the EU

After last week’s introduction to the EU’s general structure, we now zoom in on executive politics in the European Union. We therefore pick back up some of the themes from week 4, when we focused on national-level executives. But as we will see, although we can come up with some important parallels to these discussions from the national bloc, executive politics in the EU has some peculiar characteristics. In particular, understanding executive politics in the EU requires us to carefully unpack the relationship between national and supranational executive power in the context of the EU’s dual executive structure. As a result, we will also highlight numerous connections to discussions from the past two weeks about the process of European integration.

*Lecture*

In this lecture, we will concentrate on answering two major questions: What does executive politics look like in the EU? And why does the form of executive politics in the EU matter? We begin by briefly recapping the classical differences in executive power at the national level – i.e. the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems. We then discuss the limitations of that framework in trying to understand executive politics in the EU. That leads us to describe the nature of the Council and the Commission as institutions, and to consider their respective relationships to the EU’s member states. In the process, we discuss different theories of executive politics, as well as concepts like administrative and political accountability. We will also draw out relevant connections to the two major integration theories, Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism.

*Classes*

In class this week we turn to examine recent trends in the nature of executive politics in the EU. In particular, we focus on the possibility that the current Juncker Commission is more “politicized” than its predecessors and discuss why that might matter for our understanding of executive power in the EU. For your exercise, you will be asked to discuss these developments with relation to Brexit.

*Learning objectives of week 10*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Theory | Empirical knowledge | Application |
| * Understand theories of executive politics. | * Describe he nature of the Council and the Commission, as well as their respective relationships to the EU’s member states. * Describe the framework of political and administrative accountability in the EU. | * Discuss how the nature of the executive politics may have changed over the recent crises, with a special focus on Brexit. |

Week 11: Legislative Politics in the EU

In this week we conceive the EU as a bicameral political system, where the European Parliament is directly elected by the voters (lower house) and the Council represents the interests of national governments (upper house). We will get to know the rules that govern coalition building and decision making in each of these two “chambers”. Subsequently, we study the interactions between European Parliament and the Council in the Ordinary Legislative Procedure.

*Lecture*

The lecture starts with a review of week 3 (Legislatures). We discuss the role of the European Parliament and the Council vis-à-vis the European Commission. Can we classify the EU’s legislature as either strong or weak? Next we are looking into each of the two legislative bodies separately: What is the relation between the plenary and committees or work groups? How are information, amendment and voting rights allocated? What interests are represented in each of the two bodies? Is there a role for party politics? How are coalitions formed and how does that affect policy making? Finally, we take on a truly bicameral perspective by asking how Council and European Parliament interact when making EU law. Is the inter-institutional relation characterized by conflict or cooperation?

*Classes*

In classes we study the relevance of the so-called trilogues. For long it has been an informal yet institutionalized practice that delegates from the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission meet early on in the legislative process to agree on a compromise. In the treaty of Lisbon this procedures has been formalized. What are advantages of this fast-track-procedure? How does it affect the relation between European Parliament and Council? Does it affect the internal dynamics in each of the two legislative bodies?

*Learning objectives of week 11*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Theory | Empirical knowledge | Application |
| * Theories that explain the formation of legislative coalitions. * Theories of bicameralism. | * Composition of European Parliament and Council. * Rules of Procedure and internal organization of European Parliament and Council. * Ordinary Legislative Procedure | * Discuss how informal bicameral negotiations (such as the “trilogue”) affect patterns of conflict and coalition within parliament. |

Week 12: Elections and Democracy in the EU

The EU has been accused of having a democratic deficit. This week’s lecture deals with the institutional foundations of this accusation. The electoral connection between voters and the decision makers in Brussels will be in the center of this bloc. We are going to discuss the extent of the democratic deficit and whether it has its roots in a lack of a European public sphere or in particular features of the EU’s institutional design.

*Lecture*

This lecture addresses the following questions: What do Europeans think about the current state of integration? How are Members of the European Parliament elected? Do they represent the interests of their voters? Are governments, when acting in the Council, accountable to their national parliaments? In answering these questions, we are going to start with a review of week 2 (electoral systems) and 3 (legislatures) which allows us to classify the EU’s institutions from a comparative perspective. Next, we are going to see that the additional level of government creates additional challenges for democratic representation. The daily work in the EP is organized around European Political Groups, yet national parties set up the lists for European elections. Voters are often more concerned with punishing their national governments when casting their vote at European elections. Ministers enjoy a significant level of discretion when negotiating in the Council. And the media’s attention is frequently lower for EU politics as compared to national politics. The lecture will present each of these challenges and point towards its institutional foundations.

*Classes*

In the class the students will be trained to evaluate the democratic quality of the EU’s political system. On the one hand, this includes an evaluation of the state of the union against normative democratic theory. On the other hand, this includes a discussion of whether or not institutional reforms might be able to improve the democratic quality of EU politics.

*Learning objectives of week 12*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Theory | Empirical knowledge | Application |
| * Evaluate the democratic quality of a multilevel political system * Understand the basic concepts of principal agent theory (agency drift, oversight mechanisms) * Know the theory of second order elections | * Relevance of Parties and Political Groups in the European Parliament * Public Opinion on the state of integration * Rules for and voting patterns in European Parliament elections | * Discuss the democratic quality of the European Union * Discuss how electoral rules affect voter representation in the European Parliament |

Week 13: Judicial Politics in the EU

In western nation states we take the powers of the judiciary for granted. In most cases, we observe an independent, hierarchical and differentiated courts system as well as a constitutional court that constraints legislative and executive power. So far, we have learned that member states delegated significant legislative competences to the EU, but only limited competences to execute and implement law. But to what extent has judicial oversight over legislation and implementation been integrated? In this lecture, we will describe the powers of the European Court of Justice and see how it obtained increasing independence over the course of European integration.

*Lecture*

In the lecture we will start by describing the EU’s court system, specifically the European Court of Justice, with regard to its composition and its most important procedures. We will place special emphasis on the institutionalized relation between the European Court of Justice and the member states, the so-called “institutionalist model” of judicial politics (Dyevre 2010). Once we have delineated the court’s role in the EU’s present political system, we will apply the integration theories (see Week 8) to explain how the court step by step established its powers vis-à-vis the member states. Specifically, we will see how norms such as the direct effect and the supremacy of EU law have been established and institutionalized. Guided by integration theories we will also study the relation of the European Court of Justice to national judicial systems.

*Classes*

In the class the students will be trained to analyze the European Court of Justice discretion vis-à-vis the member states from a strategic perspective. Specifically, we will discuss how the court has been able to extent its powers by exploiting disunity amongst member states.

*Learning objectives of week 13*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Theory | Empirical knowledge | Application |
| * Understand the “institutionalist model” of judicial politics. * Understand the basics of legal integration theory and its nexus to integration theories (week 8) | * Powers, composition and procedures of the European Court of Justice. * History of Legal Integration (key decision by the ECJ). | * Apply integration theories to legal integration. * Apply institutionalist model of judicial politics to the ECJ. |

Week 14: The EU as a Global Actor

The history of European Integration has seen a number of halfhearted attempts of installing a common EU foreign policy. In fact, until today there is only one policy area where the EU acts as an unrivaled and powerful actor at the global stage: international trade. In common defense and security policy NATO is still at the wheel and the common neighborhood policy is frequently hampered by divergent regional interests of member states.

*Lecture*

In this last lecture on the EU, we are going to add yet another analytical level by studying the EU’s role in global politics. In how far can 28 member states with partly very different regional interests and resources agree on a common foreign policy? How do national parliaments, courts and referenda constrain the common foreign policy? Why is the EU an extremely powerful actor in international trade, but not in security, defense or development policies? Who do you call to speak to Europe? The lecture starts by describing the EU’s competences and decision bodies in different fields of foreign policy. Specifically, we will focus on the common trade policy and the set-up of the External Action Service. In the second part of the lecture, we will explain the current state of the EU’s common foreign policy from a rational and a sociological institutionalist perspective.

*Classes*

In class students will analyze EU trade negotiations along one of the recent examples such as CETA, TTIP or (maybe) the upcoming Brexit negotiations. Specifically, they will study the relationship between national parliaments, governments, the Commission and the international partner (USA, Canada, or Britain) from multiple principal agent perspective. In doing so, they will learn the limits of and conditions for a successful EU foreign policy.

*Learning objectives of week 14*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Theory | Empirical knowledge | Application |
| * Understand the implications of institutional constraints on foreign policy making. | * Actors in EU foreign policy making. * Legal framework of Common trade policy. | * Apply rational choice theory to current trade negotiations. |

# 5. Readings for Political Institutions

Students are expected to acquire on book:

Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2011) *The political system of the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan (3rd edition), pp. 1-20, 23-48, 49-74, 75-104, 105-157.

Additional readings in compendium and on-line:

Beramendi, P. (2007) ‘Federalism’, in Carles Boix & Susan Stokes (eds.), *Oxford Handbook on Comparative Politics*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 752-781 (30 pages) (copy in compendium).

Benoit, K (2007) ‘Electoral laws as political consequences’, *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 363-388 (36 pages) (online article).

Barnett, Michael & Martha Finnemore (2007) ‘Political approach chapter 2’ in Thomas G Weiss & Sam Daws (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of the United Nations*, Oxford University Press, pp. 41-57 (17 pages) (copy in compendium).

Buzan, Berry (2004) *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge, chapter 6, pp. 161-204 (44 pages) (copy in compendium).

Cheibub, A., Przeworski, A. & Saigh, S. M. (2004) Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, *British Journal of Political Science*, 34(4): 565-587 (23 pages) (online article).

Caramani, D. (2013) ‘Party systems’, chapter 13 in Caramani (ed.), *Comparative Politics*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 327-345 (19 pages) (copy in compendium).

Carrubba, C.J., Gabel, M. & Hankla, C. (2008) Judicial behavior under political constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice. *American Political Science Review*, 102(04): 435-452 (18 pages) (online article).

Coleman, J.J. (1999) Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness, *American Political Science Review*, 93(4): 821-835 (25 pages) (online article).

Da Conceicao, E. (2010) Who controls whom? Dynamics of power delegation and agency losses in EU trade politics. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48(4): 1107-1126 (20 pages) (online article).

Dalton, R.J. (2012) Politics in Germany in Powell in G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. *Comparative Politics Today. A World View*, 10th ed. Pierman, pp. 255-259+271-272+280-283 (10 pages) (copy in compendium).

Dür, A. & Zimmermann, H. (2007) Introduction: The EU in international trade negotiations. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(4): 771-787 (17 pages) (online article).

Dyevre, A. (2010) Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics: towards a general theory of judicial behaviour. *European Political Science Review*, 2(2): 297-327 (31 pages) (online article).

Follesdal, A. & Hix, S. (2006) Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik. JCMS: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(3): 533-562 (30 pages) (online article).

Gallager, M. (2013) ‘Electoral systems’, chapter 10 in Caramani (ed.), *Comparative Politics*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 184-188 (5 pages) (copy in compendium).

Hall, Peter A. & Rosemary C.R. Taylor (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, *Political Studies* 44(5): 936-955 (20 pages) (online article).

Hargreaves, S. & Homewood, M.J. (2013) *EU Law Concentrate: Law Revision and Study Guide*. Oxford University Press, pp. 1-20 (20 pages) (copy in compendium).

Häge, F. M. & Kaeding, M. (2007) Reconsidering the European Parliament’s legislative influence: Formal vs. informal procedures. *European Integration*, 29(3): 341-361 (21 pages) (online article).

Jupille, J. & J. A. Caporaso (1999) Institutionalism and the European Union: beyond International Relations and Comparative Politics, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2: 429-444 (16 pages) (online article)

Keohane, Robert O. (1984), “After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy,” genoptrykt i Mingst, Karen A. & Jack L. Snyder (eds.) *Essential Readings in World Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton), pp. 338-354 (17 pages) (copy in compendium).

Knudsen, Tonny Brems (2015) Primary institutions and international organizations: Theorizing continuity and change. Paper for the 9th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Sicily, 23-26 Sptember 2015 (27 pages) (copy in compendium).

Kreppel, A. (2014) ‘Typologies and Classifications’ in S. Martin, T. Saalfeld & K.W. Strøm (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 82-100 (19 pages) (copy in compendium).

Loughlin, J. (2011) ‘Federal and local government institutions’, in Caramani (ed.) *Comparative Politics*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 199-211 (13 pages) (copy in compendium).

McAlister, I. & Studlar, D. (2002) ’Electoral systems and women’s representation: a long-term perspective’, *Representation* 39(1): 3-14 (12 pages) (online article).

Moravcsik, Andrew & Frank Schimmelfennig (2009) ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism’, in Antje Wiener & Thomas Diez (eds) *European Integration Theory*. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 67-87 (21 pages) (copy in compendium).

Niemann, A. & Ioannou, D. (2015) ‘European economic integration in times of crisis: a case of neofunctionalism?’ *Journal of European Public Policy,* 22(2): 196-215 (20 pages) (online article).

Niemann, Arne & Philippe C. Schmitter (2009) ‘Neo-functionalism’, in Antje Wiener & Thomas Diez (eds) *European Integration Theory*. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 45-65 (21 pages) (copy in compendium).

Peterson, J. (2016) ‘Juncker's Political European Commission and an EU in Crisis’, JCMS: *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Early View. (20 pages) (online article).

Rasmussen, A. & Reh, C. (2013) The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(7): 1006-1024 (19 pages) (online article).

Schain, M.A. (2012) Politics in France in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. *Comparative Politics Today. A World View*, 10th ed. Pierman, pp. 200-202+227-233 (10 pages) (copy in compendium)

Schimmelfennig, Frank (2016) “NATO and institutional theories of international relations”, in Mark Webber & Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.) Theori*sing NATO New perspectives on the Atlantic alliance*. London: Routledge, pp. 93-115 (13 pages) (copy in compendium).

Schimmelfennig, F. (2015) ‘Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis’, *Journal of European Public Poli*cy, 22(2): 177-192 (16 pages) (online article).

Sieberer, U. (2011) The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments: A Multidimensional Analysis, *West European Politics*, 34(4): 731-754 (24 pages) (online article).

Stein, Arthur A. (1982) Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. *International organization*, 36(2): 299-324 (26 pages) (online article).

Wlezien, C. & Soroka, S.N. (2011) ‘Federalism and Public Responsiveness to Policy’, *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 41(1): 31-52 (22 pages) (online article).